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Abstract

concerning public investment solicitation from
accredited investors [41]. Accredited investors are
individuals who either have income exceeding
$200,000 per year or have at least $1 million in
assets, excluding the primary residence [39].
Preliminary research on Title II equity crowdfunding
shows that over $1.4 billion have been committed by
accredited investors to Title II projects [26], however
much less is known about Title III.
Title III of the JOBS Act expanded permissible
equity crowdfunding to include the general public
[18]. Title III allows companies to raise up to $1
million from accredited and non-accredited investors
over a 12-month period and it allows individual nonaccredited investors to commit up to $2,000 a year to
equity crowdfunded projects if the person’s income is
less than $100,000 a year and up to $10,000 if the
person’s income is above $100,000 [18].
Investor participation in early stage venture
financing exposes the investors to many risks [43].
Concerns about individual non-accredited investor
protections delayed the implementation of Title III
provisions until May 2016 [18]. A theoretical
evaluation of Title III legislation suggested that Title
III would likely fail due to information asymmetry
and adverse selection problems [7], yet little is
known about the actual state of affairs across Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms. This is the research
gap that we begin to address in the present study.
We analyze 133 projects across sixteen Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms that sought to raise
funding in the period between May 2016 and
February 2017. In addition to providing empirical
evidence that entrepreneurial ventures can be
successful in raising funds under Title III, we also
examine the effects of market, execution and agency
risks on venture fundraising success in Title III
equity crowdfunding. Our results reveal that all three
types of risks can affect the success of fundraising in
Title III platforms.
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as
follows. First, we provide an overview of prior
research on equity crowdfunding. Next, we draw on
research in risk capital investments and we develop
the research framework in our study. We then

Title III of the JOBS Act took effect in May 2016
and it began a new chapter in equity crowdfunding in
the United States by providing an opportunity for
entrepreneurial ventures to solicit funding from nonaccredited investors. Due to the relative novelty, little
is known about factors that can affect equity
crowdfunding success under Title III. To address this
gap in research, we draw on the risk capital
framework and we examine the effects of market,
execution and agency risks in equity crowdfunding
under Title III. We collect data on 133 ventures that
attracted more than $11 million in funding
commitments across sixteen Title III equity
crowdfunding platforms. We find that all three types
of risks can affect the likelihood of successful
fundraising under Title III. We discuss the
implications of these findings for entrepreneurs,
investors, crowdfunding platforms and policy makers.

1. Introduction
Equity crowdfunding refers to the process of
raising funds for entrepreneurial ventures, typically
via Internet-based platforms, whereby investors
receive equity in exchange for capital [42]. Equity
crowdfunding is distinct from rewards-based
crowdfunding. In rewards-based crowdfunding,
project backers provide funds to early stage
entrepreneurial projects, typically in exchange for a
discount on the planned product, but receive no
equity in the project. For example, Oculus Rift raised
over $2.4 million on Kickstarter [14], a rewardsbased crowdfunding platform, through pre-orders for
the virtual reality headset, but the individual backers
received no equity in the company and they did not
benefit from the $2.3 billion acquisition of the
company by Facebook [11].
Equity crowdfunding was explicitly prohibited in
the United States prior to the passage of the JOBS
Act in 2012 [40]. The JOBS Act sought to make it
easier for entrepreneurs to raise funding and it
contains several provisions. Title II of the JOBS Act
became effective in 2013 and it relaxed the rules
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describe the data and our analytical methodology,
and we present the results. We conclude with a
discussion of emergent insights and implications of
our
findings
for
entrepreneurs,
investors,
crowdfunding platforms and policy makers.

2. Equity crowdfunding literature review
Equity crowdfunding is distinct from other types
of crowdfunding that exist, in that it allows backers
to receive an equity stake in the company. Generally,
four types of crowdfunding are recognized: rewardsbased, equity-based, loan-based and donation-based.
Rewards-based crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to
raise funding by enabling project backers to pre-order
a product or service that is being developed.
Rewards-based crowdfunding has always been legal
in the United States, Famously, Joseph Pulitzer, the
publisher of New York World, led a crowdfunding
campaign to build the pedestal for the Statue of
Liberty and successfully raised funding from 160,000
contributors in 1885 [36].
IndieGogo and KickStarter were among the first
platforms to leverage the Internet to expand the reach
of rewards-based crowdfunding and they have
brokered over $3 billion in funding commitments
since launch [19]. There is an active stream of
research exploring factors that affect the success of
projects hosted on these platforms [22,31,32],
however these studies do not necessarily yield useful
insights for equity-based crowdfunding, because
investor motivations for participation in equity-based
crowdfunding platforms are very different from
backers in rewards-based crowdfunding [5]. Equity
investors are typically motivated by the expected
gains in the value of their investments, as opposed to
receiving a product or service from a rewards-based
project.
Loan-based, also known as peer-to-peer (P2P),
lending is the third type of crowdfunding. Platforms
that facilitate P2P lending, e.g. LendingClub,
typically perform credit risk assessment on the
requests for unsecured personal loans and they
connect borrowers with potential lenders. The key
difference between loan-based and equity-based
crowdfunding is the risk/reward profile of the
participating investors. P2P lending typically
involves relatively short-term loans (6-36 months),
with a clearly defined interest rate that is set at the
time of loan origination. Equity-based crowdfunding
exposes the investors to much greater uncertainty in
terms of both the time horizon for realizing a return
on the investment, as well the likelihood of earning a
financial return. Research on early stage venture
investments suggests that it commonly takes 5-8

years for the investors in early stage entrepreneurial
ventures to achieve liquidity and more than half of
the investments in early stage ventures result in a loss
of the invested capital [27].
Whereas the participation in equity, rewards, and
loan-based crowdfunding is typically motivated by
self-interest [5], there are also crowdfunding
platforms, e.g. Kiva.org, that facilitate philanthropic
activities. Donors on the Kiva platform provide funds
to support entrepreneurs in developing countries.
This activity is primarily altruistic – the donors have
no financial incentives to participate on the platform.
Table 1 summarizes the key differences between
different types of crowdfunding.
Table 1. Capital provider motivations, risks and
liquidity horizons across crowdfunding categories
Donationbased CF

Rewardsbased CF

Capital
provider
motivation
Risks

Altruism

Product
or service

None

Liquidity
horizon

Not
applicable

Product
or service
not
delivered
Not
applicable

Loanbased
CF
Earned
interest

Equitybases CF

Loss of
principal

Loss of
investment

6-36
months

5-8 years

Equity
appreciation

While equity crowdfunding is a relatively recent
phenomenon in the United States, a number of other
countries have had a head start. Equity crowdfunding
has always been legal in Australia and the Australian
Small Scale Offering Board (ASSOB) has helped
entrepreneurs raise over $146 million since its launch
in 2005 [4]. Ahlers et al. [3] examined factors that
influence equity crowdfunding success on ASSOB
and found that provision of financial projections by
the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs retaining a
greater share of equity were positively associated
with crowdfunding success.
Equity crowdfunding regulation has advanced
rapidly in Europe and each country in the European
Union has at least one equity crowdfunding platform
[12]. Several studies have explored factors that can
affect the success of equity crowdfunding on the
European platforms. Lukkarinen et al. [25] examined
an equity crowdfunding platform in Finland and
found that the size of the entrepreneurs’ social
networks had a positive effect on the likelihood of
successful fundraising, while the minimum
investment amount required from each potential
investor had a negative effect on the likelihood of
success. Vismara [45,46] explored success factors on
Crowdcube, an equity crowdfunding platform based
in the United Kingdom (UK) and found that social
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connections, equity retention and engagement of
professional investors were positively associated with
successful
campaigns.
Professional
investor
involvement was also identified as an important
factor by Ralcheva and Roosenbloom who also
studied Crowdcube [38].
Focusing on equity crowdfunding in the United
States, Agrawal et al. [1] presented a theoretical
analysis highlighting the potential for the
crowdfunding platforms to amplify information
asymmetries that commonly exist in early stage
ventures. Entrepreneurs typically know more about
the prospects of a business venture than the potential
investors and the information asymmetry presents a
challenge in the evaluation of investment
opportunities. However, in a subsequent study, the
authors found that angel investors often pool their
resources and form syndicates, wherein a well-known
investor takes the lead role in performing the due
diligence on potential investments, thus providing a
solution to the information asymmetry challenges [2].
Focusing on Title II equity crowdfunding platforms,
Mamonov et al. [26] showed that real estate projects
are particularly successful in raising funding from the
accredited investors under Title II. Table 2
summarizes the insights of empirical studies that
examined equity crowdfunding in different
geographies.
Table 2. Empirical studies in equity CF
Authors / Context
Ahlers et al. (2015) [3]
Australian Small Scale
Offering Board
Lukkarinen et al. (2016)
[25]
Finland

Vismara (2016) [45]
Crowdcube, UK
Vismara (2016) [46]
Crowdcube, UK
Ralcheva and
Roosenbloom (2016)
[38]
Crowdcube, UK
Catalini et al. (2016) [2]
Angel.co – Title II

Insights
Provision of financial
projections and entrepreneurs
retaining greater equity
percentage are associated with
successful fundraising.
The size of the minimum
investment (negative effect)
and early finding from
entrepreneurs’ private networks
are associated with successful
fundraising.
Equity retention and number of
social connections in social
networking sites are predictive
of funding success.
Engagement of well-known
investors has a positive effect
on project success.
Professional investor
involvement and patents are
associated with success.

Syndicate driven investments
dominate the angel investor
oriented equity crowdfunding

equity crowdfunding
Mamonov et al., (2017)
[26]
Title II equity
crowdfunding platforms

platform.
Real estate investments are
disproportionately more
successful in Title II
crowdfunding.

3. Research framework and hypotheses
The goal of the present study is to understand
factors that can impact the success of equity
crowdfunding under Title III. Title III equity
crowdfunding is open to both accredited and nonaccredited investors. While little is known about the
criteria that may influence non-accredited investor
decision making in this context, research has
suggested that faced with the uncertainty of
investment decisions, less knowledgeable investors
often take their cues from experts [20]. We expect
that in Title III equity crowdfunding less
sophisticated investors will follow the lead of
business angels (accredited investors) who are also
active in Title III equity crowdfunding platforms.
Hence, we draw on research focusing on business
angel investor decision making to develop the
theoretical framework in our study.
Research has shown that investors in informal
risk capital markets focus on risks that fall into three
general categories: market risk, execution risk and
agency risk [6]. Market risk is the risk of losing
money on an investment due to overall market
factors.
Examples of market factors include
competition, recession, political turmoil, and growth
potential. Many of these risks are external to the
venture and outside the entrepreneur’s control.
However, prior research has shown that market risk is
the top reason why professional angel investor groups
reject an investment [6,28]. When analyzing market
risk, investors typically consider the stage of the
venture in question. Market risk is reduced as the
venture proceeds from idea/concept to prototype to
actual sales.
A venture that is just in the idea/concept phase
has the most market risk because its market potential
has not been proven. As the venture moves from the
idea/concept stage to the prototype/minimal viable
product stage some uncertainty about the product is
removed. However, the market risk still remains
high.
A venture needs to show that its product/service
can succeed in the market. It can accomplish this by
selling its product/service directly to consumers for a
business-to-consumer (B2C) venture or signing
corporate customers for a business-to-business (B2B)
venture [13]. Successful consumer product launches
and signings of marquee corporate clients are
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commonly interpreted by risk capital investors as
market validation [28] and we expect a similar
behavior among the investors in the context of equity
crowdfunding platforms.
H1a. Ventures that completed product/service
development are more likely to raise funding in
online equity crowdfunding campaigns than early
stage ventures (ideas and prototypes).
H1b. Ventures that have large corporate clients
are more likely to raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns than ventures lacking
such clients.
Prior research has shown that investors consider
whether the venture represents a disruptive or
incremental innovation as a criterion for providing
funding [29]. Startups that offer only incremental
innovations are unlikely to succeed in competition
with established incumbents. This is due to the fact
that incumbents typically have greater resources (i.e.,
financial, marketing, R&D, etc.) than startups and
can react aggressively to incremental innovation. For
example, the incumbent can accelerate their R&D
cycle to develop and market a similar or superior
incremental innovation [21].
Startups based on a disruptive innovation are
more likely to attract funding [9]. While not a perfect
proxy for disruptive innovation, patents provide
strong evidence of significant practical innovation
[15]. Patents also provide protection for startups from
potential imitation by incumbents and thus they can
offer a source of sustainable competitive advantage.
H2. Ventures that hold patents are more likely to
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding
campaigns than ventures that do not have patents.
Execution risk is the risk that a venture’s business
plans will not succeed in the market. In order to
execute their plans successfully, startup ventures
require a diverse portfolio of skills, such as, product
development, marketing, operations, financial
management, etc. [24]. No individual entrepreneur is
likely to possess all of the skills required to make the
venture a success. Prior research indicates that
venture capitalists are more likely to invest in startup
teams over single entrepreneurs [17]. In addition,
venture capitalists prefer teams that are comprised of
both young entrepreneurs with new ideas and more
seasoned executives who can guide the venture to
successful execution of its plans [17].
Research has shown that angel investors consider
an entrepreneur’s prior industry experience and prior
entrepreneurial experience when deciding whether to
invest [28]. Potential investors value prior
entrepreneurial experience due to the fact that in

order to realize financial reward from an early stage
investment the venture must have an “exit” (buyout
or public offering). Entrepreneurs who have had
previous successful exits understand the expectations
of investors and have shown their ability to deliver
financial rewards.
H3a. Single entrepreneurs are less likely to
successfully raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns than entrepreneurial
teams comprised of 2 or more members.
H3b. Serial entrepreneurs are more likely to
successfully raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.
H3c. Entrepreneurs with prior experience in the
target industry are more likely to raise funding in
online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
H3d. Larger entrepreneurial teams are more likely
to successfully raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.
The information asymmetry between the
entrepreneurs and potential investors leads to agency
risk. Entrepreneurs know more about their business
than potential investors.
This can lead to
opportunism which is more common among younger,
smaller firms [37]. Angel investors typically mitigate
the agency risk by close involvement in the
entrepreneurial ventures in which they invest.
However, online platform-mediated investments
allow for more geographically distant investments
which makes active angel investor engagement in the
entrepreneurial ventures very challenging [34]. In
these cases, potential investors might rely on another
angel investor or VC firm to take a lead role in
closely monitoring the venture. Research conducted
on the angel-oriented, equity crowdfunding platform
Angel.co has shown that successful fundraising is
dominated by syndicate-based investments. In this
structure a well-known angel investor or VC takes
the lead role – providing due diligence and close
monitoring [2].
Therefore, we anticipate that
companies that have funding from an experienced
angel or VC are more likely to attract further funding
from investors on equity crowdfunding platforms.
H4a. Ventures that have already attracted funding
from established angel investors would be more
likely to successfully raise funding in online
equity crowdfunding campaigns.
H4b. Ventures that have already attracted funding
from professional venture capital firms would be
more likely to successfully raise funding in online
equity crowdfunding campaigns.
Characteristics of the entrepreneur have been
shown to be an important screening factor for angel
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and VC investors [8]. For example, prior research
has noted the importance of entrepreneurial passion
and determination as well as trustworthiness in
successful venture fundraising [35]. Entrepreneurs
that do not show passion and determination
undermine investor confidence that the entrepreneur
can overcome the many challenges faced in
shepherding a venture to success and then an exit.
Investors also want to feel that the entrepreneur will
be a trustworthy steward of any money invested [28].
Entrepreneurs may find it challenging to
communicate their various positive characteristics to
investors in a computer-mediated context. Prior
research in rewards-based crowdfunding has shown
that video is an important communication tool in
computer-mediated communication [31]. We expect
that successful entrepreneurs will make use of video
in communicating with potential investors in equity
crowdfunding platforms.
H5a. Ventures that use video in their project
descriptions will be more likely to successfully
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
H5b. Ventures that use video featuring the
founders in their project descriptions will be more
likely to successfully raise funding in online
equity crowdfunding campaigns.

4. Data and methodology
We obtained the dataset for our study by
collecting project-level details across sixteen Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms. We collected project
descriptions as well as the information about the
amount of capital sought and funds committed by the
investors to each project. Appendix A provides a
summary of the number of projects and total capital
commitments for each of the platforms in our dataset.
Project success is the dependent variable in our
study. Following the accepted practice [3], we
defined project success, as a venture raising the
minimum amount of capital that was sought. 69 of
133 (51.9%) projects in our dataset were successful
in achieving their funding goals.
We engaged two graduate assistants with
experience in entrepreneurship and equity
crowdfunding to review the project descriptions and
code the data. The coders met with the authors to
resolve coding differences. Table 3 summarizes the
independent variable and co-variate coding schema
and it also provides the descriptive statistics for the
data in our study.
To assess the effects of the independent variables
on the project equity crowdfunding success we ran a
series of logistic regression models. We relied on

SPSS version 22 to conduct the analysis. In the next
section, we discuss the results.
Table 3. Variable coding schema and descriptive
statistics
Variable name / Coding schema
Single_entrepreneur
1 – single entrepreneur
0 – otherwise
Industry_experience
Founder(s) have experience in the
target industry:
1 – yes, 0 – no
Serial_entrepreneur
At least one of the founders has prior
entrepreneurial experience:
1 – yes, 0 – no
Team_size
The number of people involved in
the venture.
Venture_stage
Idea – venture is at the idea/concept
stage
Beta – a beta or a prototype has been
developed
Product – the product or service has
been developed and it is offered to
potential clients
Angel_investors
1 – the company has received
funding from a professional angel
investor
0 – none
VC_investment
1 – the company has received
funding from a venture capital firm
0 – none
Video
1 – venture description contains a
video
0 – none
Entrepreneur_video
1 – founder(s) appears in the video
0 – the founder(s) is not in the video
Patents_issued
1 – the company has received
patents

Descriptive
statistics
21.8% of the
ventures were led
by a single
entrepreneur
95.5% of the
ventures had
founders with
industry experience
in the target
industry
9% of the ventures
were led by serial
entrepreneurs

Min = 1
Max = 22
Average = 3.9
St. dev = 2.5
Idea = 5
Beta = 65
Product = 63

19.5% of the
ventures in our
dataset had
received funding
from professional
angel investors
18% of the
ventures in our
dataset had
received funding
from VC investors
84.9% of the
venture funding
solicitations
included a video
60.15% of the
solicitations
included a video
that featured the
founder(s)
12.8% of the
ventures had
obtained patents
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0 – none
Minimum issue amount
The minimum amount of funding
sought by the venture, in $

Min: $10,000
Max: $15 mil
Mean: $349,307
Mode: $100,000
St. dev.: $1.3 mil

5. Results
In the first step of our analysis, we examined
separate effects of market, execution, agency and
computer-mediation effects on the likelihood of
venture success in raising funding in online Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms.
Focusing on the market risks, we found that the
company development stage had an effect on the
success of a crowdfunding campaign. Companies in
the beta/prototype stage were less likely to raise
funding (B= -0.84, p<0.05) than companies that
completed product development. There was no
statistically significant effect for the companies in the
“idea” stage. This is likely due to the fact that there
were only 5 such companies in our dataset. We also
found a significant positive effect of a company
having corporate clients in its portfolio (B=0.88,
p<0.05). These results lend support for H1a and H1b.
Although 12.9% of the companies in our dataset held
patents, we found no statistically significant effects
of the patents on the likelihood of successful equity
crowdfunding. H2 was not supported. The results are
shown in Model 1 column in Table 4.
Focusing on the execution risks, we found a
statistically significant negative effect for singleentrepreneur led ventures (B= -1.15, p<0.05) and a
statistically significant positive effect for the size of
the entrepreneurial team (B=0.251, p<0.01). These
results provide support for H3a and H3d. We found
no support for the effects of prior industry experience
or serial entrepreneurial experience on the success of
equity crowdfunding in our data. H3b and H3c were
not supported. The results are shown in Model 2
column in Table 4.
Next, we examined the effects of professional
investor involvement in the mitigation of agency
risks that commonly exist in early stage ventures. We
found that when examined individually, both
professional angel investor involvement (B=1.6,
p<0.01) and venture capitalist participation (B=2.6,
p<0.001) were positively associated with the success
in equity crowdfunding, however only VC
participation was statistically significantly correlated
with the likelihood of success in the model that
included both factors. The results provide support for
H4a and H4b. Model 3 column in Table 4 provides
the summary of effects.

Finally, we assessed the full model that included
market, execution and agency risks as well as the use
of video to communicate with the potential investors
in equity crowdfunding platforms. We found that in
the full model the company stage, the size of the
entrepreneurial team, professional angel investor and
VC involvement retained their effects on the success
of equity crowdfunding under Title III. These results
remain significant after controlling for the size of the
investment required by the companies and the month
when the fundraising campaign was launched. The
results are summarized in the Full model column in
Table 4.
Table 4. The effects of market, execution and
agency risks in Title III equity crowdfunding
Model
1:
Market
risk

Model
2:
Executio
n risk

Model
3:
Agenc
y risk

Full
model

Company stage
idea
beta /
prototype

ns

ns

-0.84*

-0.78*

0.88*

1.05*

ns

ns

product
Corporate clients
Patents
Single
entrepreneur
Serial
entrepreneur
Industry
experience
Team size

-1.15*

-1.26*

ns

ns

ns

ns

0.251*

0.25*

Angel investors
VC investors

ns

0.98*

2.3**

2.14*

Video
Entrepreneur in
video
ln(Minimum
issue amount)
Campaign start
month
-2 log likelihood

ns
ns
-0.89***
ns
164.2

168.2

158

113.2

0.14

0.106

0.178

0.408

Nagelkerke R2
0.19
* - p < 0.05, *** - p < 0.001

0.141

0.238

0.537

Cox & Snell R2

Unobserved project-level heterogeneity is a
common concern in panel data analysis [33]. To
assess the potential effects of unobserved
heterogeneity we reanalyzed the full model using the
mixed logit technique which accounts for the
potential subpopulations in the data [16]. The results
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of the mixed logit model affirmed the effects of the
company stage, corporate clients, entrepreneurial
team size and single entrepreneur led ventures as well
the involvement of professional angel investors and
venture capitalists on the success of equity
crowdfunding under Title III.

6. Discussion and implications
6.1. Discussion
In this study, we argued that less sophisticated
non-accredited investors in Title III equity
crowdfunding platforms would follow the more
sophisticated investors’ lead. We drew on the risk
capital framework and we evaluated the effects of
market, execution and agency risks that are
commonly considered by professional angel investors
in traditional offline investments. Our results show
that all three types of risks have an effect on the
likelihood of a successful equity crowdfunding
campaign in online Title III equity crowdfunding
platforms. However, not all variables that we
examined had an effect.
In terms of market risks, we found that ventures
that progressed to the product/service stage were
more likely to be successful in raising funding in
Title III platforms. 65% of the ventures in the
product/service stage were successful, whereas only
43% of the ventures in the beta/prototype stage were
successful. None of the five ventures in the idea stage
was successful in achieving the funding goal. These
results indicate that investors in Title III platforms
are willing to consider companies in the
beta/prototype stage of development, however the
companies that progressed to the product/service
stage are more likely to achieve their funding goals.
We also found that while patents had no statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of success, market
traction evidenced in a company having corporate
customers had a significant positive effect. 70.3% of
companies that had corporate customers were
successful in raising funding in Title III platforms
that we examined.
Focusing on the execution risk, we found that
single entrepreneur ventures were successful only
33.3% of the time in reaching the funding goal,
whereas ventures with entrepreneurial teams were
successful 53.2% of the time. The importance of
entrepreneurial teams versus single entrepreneurs is
consistent with the insights from research on angel
investor decision making [6,44], however we found
no support for prior entrepreneurial experience or
industry experience effects on investment decisions.
In our evaluation of agency risks in Title III
crowdfunding, we focused on whether engagement of

professional angel investors and/or venture capitalists
is associated with a higher probability of successful
equity crowdfunding. We found that both angel
investor and VC participation had significant effects.
80.8% of ventures that received funding from a
prominent angel investor prior to soliciting funding
via equity crowdfunding were successful. 91.7% of
companies that received funding from a venture
capital firm prior to the engagement in equity
crowdfunding platforms were successful in hitting
their funding targets.
We also examined whether the use of video could
help entrepreneurs overcome the challenges of
communicating their passion and commitment to the
success of the ventures to potential investors.
Contrary to results from rewards-based crowdfunding
[30], we found no significant effect for the use of
video in investment solicitations. Unfortunately, our
data does not yield clues as to why the use of video
had no effect and further research will be required to
understand how entrepreneurs can leverage rich
media in communicating with investors in equity
crowdfunding platforms.
To evaluate the robustness of our model, we
examined the effect of incorporating the funding goal
amount and the month in which the equity
crowdfunding campaign was launched on the
likelihood of crowdfunding success as covariates in
our model. The effects of the key variables in our
model remained significant after the addition of these
covariates to the model. Consistent with prior
research in equity crowdfunding [45], we found a
negative effect of the funding goal amount on the
likelihood of a campaign’s success in our data.
Further examination of the data revealed that 46 of
133 ventures (35.4%) sought to raise less than
$100,000 and 70% of these ventures were successful
in raising the target capital. Whereas ventures
seeking more than $500,000 were successful only
33.4% of the time, and none of the ventures that
sought to raise over $1 million was successful.
In aggregate, our results suggest that investors in
Title III crowdfunding platforms generally share their
approach to potential investment evaluation with the
professional angel investors. We find that investors in
these platforms are perceptive to market, execution
and agency risks. The investors prefer to fund
companies that are headed by entrepreneurial teams
(as opposed to a single entrepreneur). The investors
also prefer companies that completed product or
service development and are showing market traction
by signing corporate customers. Our results also
indicate that investors in Title III equity
crowdfunding platforms are looking for external
validation of the ventures seeking funding and
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management of agency risks in the form of traditional
angel investor or VC involvement. These results
imply that although Title III platforms are aimed at
the less sophisticated non-accredited investors, the
apparent patterns of investor decision making suggest
that sophisticated investors play a key role in
influencing the success of individual campaigns.

6.2. Contributions to theory
Our study makes a number of contributions to
both theory and practice. Our first theoretical
contribution is the adoption of the risk capital
framework that was developed in the offline context
[6] for the analysis of factors that can affect online
venture equity crowdfunding success. The risk capital
framework complements signaling and social capital
perspectives that have been applied in studies of
equity crowdfunding [3,10]. The risk perspective
recognizes that understanding how investors evaluate
potential investment opportunities is critical to
entrepreneurs securing an investment. The risk
perspective focuses on actual risk evaluation,
whereas the signaling perspective addresses the
question of how entrepreneurs can signal the fitness
of their ventures to potential investors. Actual risks
and what entrepreneurs may be able to signal to
potential investors are distinct and therefore there is a
need to understand the fundamental risks inherent to
early stage ventures and how these risks affect
investment decision in equity crowdfunding.
Our second theoretical contribution stems from
provision of empirical evidence that shows that
investors in Title III equity crowdfunding platform
share their approach to investment evaluation with
traditional offline business angel investors. These
results suggest that while the Title III goal was to
open access to early stage venture investments to
non-accredited investors, it is the sophisticated and
likely accredited investors who play the critical role
in venture fundraising success under Title III. These
results contribute to the emerging stream of evidence
on the importance of experts in equity crowdfunding
decisions [20] and suggest that such behavior may
reflect rational herding [47] wherein less
sophisticated investors follow the lead of the more
experienced business angels.

6.3. Implications for practice
Our findings also have implications for
entrepreneurs and operators of the crowdfunding
platforms as well as policy makers. The empirical
insights emergent from our study suggest that Title
III equity crowdfunding platforms can be a source of

early capital for entrepreneurial ventures, however
the amount of available capital tends to be relatively
low – less than $1 million and more commonly less
than $300,000. Given the relatively low amount of
capital that can be raised in Title III platforms, these
platforms are likely to be supplementary sources of
funding for entrepreneurs. In other words,
entrepreneurs seeking seed (typically $500,000 – $1
million) or series A (typically $1-$5 million) funding,
would likely need to engage with traditional angel
investors as the primary source of funds and then
possibly augment the fundraising via a Title III
campaign.
These observations also have implications for the
operators of the Title III equity crowdfunding
platforms. Provided that, at least at the moment, Title
III platforms would be unlikely to serve as a singular
source of seed or series A funds for new ventures, the
platforms would benefit from close alignment with
established angel investors and early stage venture
capitalists in order to generate deal flow and sustain
interest from potential non-accredited investors. In
fact, WeFunder, the most successful platform in our
dataset, emerged from Y Combinator, one of the best
known venture accelerator programs that has a strong
VC network [23].
Equity crowdfunding remains a hotly debated
policy topic and Title III has received a fair share of
criticism for coming up short in solving the challenge
of easier access to funding for entrepreneurial
ventures while also assuring investor protection
[7,43]. The results of our study indicate that while
Title III had a slower start compared to Title II [26],
legislation has been adopted in practice and Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms are gaining traction.

6.4. Limitations
While we collected data across all known Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms, out dataset contains
only 133 venture listings. It is known that several of
the platforms included in our dataset remove
unsuccessful campaigns from their sites, thus
potentially biasing our results. However, our dataset
does reflect the historical information that is actually
available to potential investors on Title III platforms
and 64 of 133 (48.1%) ventures did not reach the full
target amount affording us an opportunity to examine
the factors associated with fundraising success under
Title III. Further research will be needed to
reevaluate the insights that emerged in our study as
Title III platforms continue to develop.
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